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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that the chief executive officer of a large company has been 
convicted, after a fair trial, of embezzling millions of dollars. Imagine further 
that the criminal law regime where this takes place provides very limited 
remedies. The embezzler must return all the money that she has embezzled, but 
only up to any amount she actually has on hand, in cash. She may also refuse 
to pay, at her option. She does not get fired or even temporarily suspended 
from her job as CEO. Further, after conviction, she serves no prison sentence. 
She pays fines neither to her company nor to the shareholders whose trust she 
has betrayed. She pays no damages, punitive or otherwise. Her company may 
not garnish her wages to pay back the amount embezzled. The only remedy 
available is limited restitution of any cash left in hand. 
This hypothetical is actually not that different from how remedies work in 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).1 At the heart of the WTO lies a set of 
rules and negotiated trade terms, such as tariffs, designed to promote trade 
liberalization or the removal of barriers to free trade. When a WTO member 
nation violates a rule or trade term, the affected nation or nations may bring a 
complaint under the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO.2 When nations 
win cases at the WTO, the preferred remedy is that the losing nation withdraws 
the offending measure or rule.3 This action is akin to stopping the 
embezzlement going forward. The remedy is purely prospective. If withdrawal 
occurs, the suit ends. If withdrawal does not occur, then the parties negotiate 
for compensation—but only if the offender agrees to pay. Fines or punitive 
damages are off the table. The remedy of last resort is the imposition of tariffs 
and import restrictions on the losing nation.4 However, this remedy is not 
helpful for developing nations that do not possess sufficient economic power to 
meaningfully use the remedy.5 For some WTO nations, the only real remedy is 
prospective withdrawal. It is as unsatisfactory of a remedy as that of limited 
restitution in the embezzling example. 
 
 1 Obviously, the WTO is not a criminal system and the embezzlement analogy is not a perfect one. 
However, it is worth making to highlight the limited nature of remedies. Regardless of one’s views on the 
object and purpose of remedies, one is unlikely to find the limited remedy of restitution satisfactory. 
 2 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 3 (2004) 
[hereinafter WTO HANDBOOK]. 
 3 Chi Carmody, Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 307, 315 
(2002). 
 4 Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 
123, 126–27 (2002). 
 5 See infra Part III.C. 
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Of the 153 nations that are members of the WTO, more than two-thirds are 
developing nations.6 Yet, despite their strength in numbers, developing nations 
as a group rarely participate in dispute settlement, a core aspect of the WTO.7 
This is problematic because the WTO is essentially a self-enforcing system of 
reciprocal trade rights that relies on proactive monitoring by all members.8 Use 
of the self-enforcement mechanism—initiating cases under the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”)9—is critical. No WTO police or prosecutor 
 
 6 Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries—Overview, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 7 See The Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_sub_committee_ldc_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (explaining that the WTO 
recognizes as least-developed countries (“LDCs”) those countries that have been designated as such by the 
United Nations (“UN”); that there are at present fifty LDCs on the UN list; and that, with the accession of 
Cape Verde as a member on August 18, 2010, thirty-three of those LDCs are members of the WTO); see also 
U.N. Statistics Div., Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49) (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm (“There is no established convention for the designation 
of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas in the UN system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, 
Canada and the United States in North America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are 
considered ‘developed’ regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union 
is also treated as developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former 
Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and [the former USSR 
countries] in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions.”). But see U.N. Statistics 
Div., Millennium Development Goals Indicators: Goal 8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development: Net 
ODA as Percentage of OECD/DAC Donors GNI, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorID= 
0&SeriesId=568 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (explaining that the UN, however, does have a system to designate 
a list of those countries considered to be LDCs, whereby on the recommendation of the Committee for 
Development Policy, the General Assembly decides on the countries to be included on the LDC list). In 
Africa, the UN-designated LDCs are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United 
Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia. Id. In Asia and the Pacific, they are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen. Id. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti is a UN-designated LDC. Id. 
While there are numerous significant differences among countries falling into these groups, in this Article, the 
Author refers generally to “developing nations” to include all the LDCs and all the developing economies, 
without necessarily differentiating between them. This is not to say the differences between them are not 
important—they certainly are. Instead, this reference reflects the fact that they share certain common concerns, 
particularly with respect to trade, such that they may be treated as one group for the purpose of this Article. 
Thus, the term “developing nations” is used merely as a convenient shorthand. 
 8 WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 7 (“WTO Members have agreed to use the multilateral system for 
settling their WTO trade disputes rather than resorting to unilateral action . . . . That means abiding by the 
agreed procedures and respecting the rulings once they are issued—and not taking the law into their own 
hands.”). 
 9 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter 
DSU]; see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and 
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seeks out and punishes those who violated WTO rules. Rather, each WTO 
member has to police its interests. 
When developing nations fail to initiate cases, the result is both under-
enforcement of key WTO norms and skewed enforcement in favor of 
developed nations. First, under-enforcement occurs because the WTO is a self-
policing system. When a developing nation forgoes participation in this 
system, it forgoes not only the opportunity to right a wrong that it suffered, but 
also the opportunity to set precedent10 for other developing nations. Therefore, 
the costs of under-enforcement are both individual (lack of redress for specific 
wrong) and systemic (lack of precedent-setting). Second, skewed enforcement 
occurs because issues of particular interests to developing nations—such as 
safeguards and market access for agricultural goods—are underrepresented. As 
a result, the WTO effectively affords less robust protection to developing 
nations than their developed counterparts. 
Numerous scholars have attempted to explain why developing nations do 
not actively invoke the DSU and the literature on this topic is quite extensive.11 
 
the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1205–24 
(1994) (providing a succinct but exhaustive description and analysis of the functioning of the DSU). 
 10 While the WTO does not recognize precedent or stare decisis as such, in practice, past decisions serve 
as persuasive authority and are often relied upon as guidance in future cases. David Palmeter & Petros C. 
Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 400–02 (1998); see, e.g., Panel 
Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶¶ 3.11, 3.21, 3.29, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989); see 
also Anne Scully-Hill & Hans Mahncke, The Emergence of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis in the World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 36 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 133 (2009). 
 11 The academic literature on the need for change to either the dispute settlement process in general or 
the structure of WTO remedies is well developed. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: 
Emerging Problems, in FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 67 (2000); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS? RETALIATION UNDER THE WTO 
(2003); Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000); Anderson, 
supra note 4; Claude Barfield, WTO Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change, 37 INTERECON. 131 
(2002); Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the 
Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005); Chad P. Bown, Developing Countries as 
Plaintiffs and Defendants in the GATT/WTO Trade Disputes, 27 WORLD ECON. 59 (2004); Carmody, supra 
note 3; Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 (2001); Susan Esserman & 
Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2003, at 130; Patricio Grané, Remedies Under 
WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 755 (2001); Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays & Capacity 
Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 557–58 (2005); Robert 
Howse & Robert W. Staiger, United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (Original Complaint by the European 
Communities)–Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, 
24 February 2004: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 295 (2005); Jason Kearns & Steve 
Charnovitz, Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 
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One can trace five distinctive lines of reasoning within the existing literature. 
These explanations are: (1) lack of market share and ability to affect world 
markets; (2) fear of non-WTO or extralegal retaliation by more powerful 
trading partners; (3) costs and resource constraints; (4) lack of legal capacity 
and expertise; and (5) asymmetries or unevenness in the effectiveness of 
remedies.12 The first four reasons may be characterized as fact or status-based, 
which does not mean they are immutable or incapable of improvement. Indeed, 
the WTO system could be restructured to alleviate some of these status-based 
hardships. Elsewhere, this Author has tackled the resource constraint and lack 
of legal capacity and expertise problems.13 
The fifth reason, unevenness in the effectiveness of remedies, is primarily a 
legal problem. Understandably, most scholars working in the field have 
proposed a legal solution to the problem—usually in the form of an 
amendment to the DSU.14 In light of the current deadlock in the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations15—which are not even primarily aimed at remedies—this 
 
(2002); Kofi Oteng Kufuor, From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the 
Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117 (1997); Pieter Jan 
Kuyper, Remedies and Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to Be Effective? The State Perspective and the 
Company Perspective, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 282 (1997); Nikolaos Lavranos, Some Proposals for a 
Fundamental DSU Reform, 29 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 73 (2002); Robert M. MacLean, The Urgent 
Need to Reform the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Process, 8 INT’L TRADE L. REG. 137 (2002); Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 
(2000); Victor Mosoti, In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies 
in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A View from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 231 (2001); 
Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—Toward a More Collective 
Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335 (2000); Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-Me, 
Pull-You: The Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW. 755 
(1998); Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Mechanism for 
Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403 (2000); Joel Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 127 (2007); Henrik Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased? 
(Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 2340, 1999). In addition to the academic literature, there 
are a number of proposals by states in connection with current WTO negotiations in the Doha Round. These 
are helpfully listed and summarized at DSU Review, GEO. L. (Mar. 2009), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/ 
research/projects/dsureview/synopsis.html. In particular, see Proposal by the African Group, Negotiations on 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 25, 2002), which proposed “monetary 
compensation to be continually paid pending and until the withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO 
obligations,” and included a number of proposals by commentators. 
 12 See Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 11, at 104–05. 
 13 See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Aid for Trade: A Roadmap for Success, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101 
(2008). 
 14 See Anderson, supra note 4, at 123–34; Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 11, at 106; 
Charnovitz, supra note 11, at 755–72; Mavroidis, supra note 11, at 764–814; Reif & Florestal, supra note 11, 
at 756–57, 786–88; Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 403–16. 
 15 Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round of Negotiations, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
573, 574 (forthcoming 2011); Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Doha Round Negotiation: Suspended Indefinitely, 
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Author argues that any amendment to WTO agreements, including the DSU, 
would be extremely unlikely, perhaps even impossible. 
This Article eschews legislative solutions that require lengthy negotiations 
and ratification of amendments in favor of a creative legal strategy solution 
that can be readily implemented unilaterally by developing nations. This 
Article proposes the use of “class actions” by developing nations as a litigation 
strategy. The term class action is used as a metaphor. It is not meant as an 
explicit reference of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.16 Indeed, 
any such explicit reference or incorporation of Rule 23 would vitiate one of the 
primary benefits of this proposal—the ease of implementation without formal 
amendments to WTO documents. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I sketches out the proposed class 
action litigation strategy. Part II argues that the strategy is needed because 
developing nations are disadvantaged in every stage of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement process. Part III explains the inadequacies of current WTO 
remedies. The class action strategy is elaborated in detail in Part IV, which 
begins with a detailed example of how the proposal might work in real life. 
Part V provides an exhaustive list of criteria to use in evaluating this Article’s 
proposal. The Article concludes in Part VI with a call for reform. 
I. THE PROPOSAL IN A NUTSHELL 
This Article describes how developing nations could implement a litigation 
strategy by relying on a quasi “class action” model. Developing nations would 
be allowed freer rein to exercise third-party rights, through existing provisions 
for joinder, in a manner that would allow them to pool their complaints in 
cases against larger or more developed nations. The strategy could also be used 
against industrializing nations, such as China or India. The primary mechanism 
for this is the regular joinder provision of the DSU.17 However, the strategy 
would be strengthened by procedural changes to the right to join as a third 
party, such as making the right automatic, upon notification to the Dispute 
Settlement Body (“DSB”), for least-developed countries. 
 
INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y Int’l Law, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 5, 2006, available at http://www.asil. 
org/insights060905.cfm; Doha Deadlock Continues, FORBES.COM (Apr. 15, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www. 
forbes.com/2010/04/14/doha-trade-wto-business-oxford-analytica.html; In Quotes: The Doha Deadlock, BBC 
NEWS (July 26, 2006, 10:20 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/5216080.stm. 
 16 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 17 DSU, supra note 9, art. 10. 
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Each nation would play an active role in the dispute settlement process, but 
one nation—generally either the nation that is most economically powerful or 
the most experienced in WTO litigation—would take a leading role and serve 
as the representative plaintiff, much in the way a named plaintiff in a real class 
action might. In the remedies stage, all named parties would benefit from 
prospective withdrawal if that were the remedy implemented, just as all third 
parties currently do. However, if withdrawal were not to occur, then all parties 
would get to aggregate their level of harm, such that the threatened trade 
retaliation could be equal to the sum of all of the harm suffered by the class. 
The class could then decide to exercise retaliation collectively, allowing, for 
instance, the representative plaintiff to impose countermeasures on their behalf. 
The choice to impose countermeasures individually or in the aggregate would 
lie with the class. More importantly, the class would have the right to trade the 
levels of retaliation unevenly within the class. This means that the smaller 
members of the class could grant the quantification of amount of harm that 
they suffered to another class member, allowing that member to exercise 
retaliation on its behalf. 
A. The Need to Encourage Developing Nations to Participate More in Dispute 
Settlement 
The need for developing nations to make use of the DSU is important for 
several reasons. Since its inception in 1995, the WTO has ushered in a 
welcome period of increasing engagement by developing nations in many 
crucial areas—such as participation in negotiations, particularly during the 
Doha Round.18 This increased engagement shows that developing nations see 
themselves as invested in the multilateral system and are willing to play an 
active role to ensure the system is responsive to their needs.19 Greater 
participation in the dispute settlement system is another critical facet of this 
endeavor. As the WTO is a system primarily based on self-enforcement, 
developing nations need to be able to actively enforce their rights within the 
system through dispute settlement. Put another way, if developing nations 
cannot effectively enforce the rights they already have, why should they be 
 
 18 See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case7_e.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2011); see also 
Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 483 (2007). 
 19 Jayashree Watal, Developing Countries’ Interests in a Development Round, in THE WTO AFTER 
SEATTLE 71, 71–72 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (explaining that for many decades, developing nations were 
not significant players in the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT). 
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bothered to negotiate for additional rights or to accept more obligations? 
Effective enforcement, through meaningful remedies, is a necessary 
precondition to developing nations’ greater participation in the WTO in 
general. 
B. A Note on Scope 
Each of the challenges facing developing nations are important and have 
drawn attention, albeit unevenly, in the existing literature.20 This Article 
focuses primarily on the unevenness in effectiveness of remedies structure and 
proposes a workable solution, in the form of a limited “class action” remedy 
for developing nations. The chosen focus of this Article does not undercut the 
importance of the other problems. Indeed, this Author addressed the problems 
of costs and lack of legal capacity and expertise in a previous article on 
technical assistance or aid for trade.21 Solutions, such as private sector 
assistance to lower litigation costs for developing nations22 and procedural 
safeguards to enhance existing special and differential treatment provisions 
already in the DSU23 are important proposals within the existing WTO 
architecture. However, while helpful, they do not materially alter the 
underlying incentives for developing nations to bring suits at the WTO. Only a 
change to the underlying remedies structure would accomplish that. This 
Article proposes such a potentially game-changing structural reform. 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS AND THE 
CHALLENGES DEVELOPING NATIONS FACE 
The WTO’s dispute settlement process has been described thoroughly 
elsewhere.24 For our purposes, it is sufficient to roughly sketch the process, for 
context. Although this Part traces the contours of WTO dispute settlement 
 
 20 See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing 
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861 (2005) (providing an in-
depth exploration of how the private sector can better assist in alleviating the cost obstacles facing developing 
nations). 
 21 See Cai, supra note 13. 
 22 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 20, at 873–88. 
 23 See Andrea M. Ewart, Small Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural Approach to Special and 
Differential Treatment Through Reforms to Dispute Settlement, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 27 (2007); 
see also Amin Alavi, On the (Non)-Effectiveness of the World Trade Organization’s Special and Differential 
Treatments in the Dispute Settlement Process, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 319, 320 (2007). 
 24 See generally WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO 
Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 469, 470 (2003); Bown, supra note 11. 
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procedures, it primarily serves to highlight the special problems developing 
nations confront in each step of the process. The emphasis on the challenges 
developing nations face in effectively utilizing the dispute settlement system 
underscores the need for creative solutions. 
The dispute settlement process is divided into four stages: (1) 
consultations; (2) panel process; (3) appeal (if any); and (4) implementation 
and enforcement.25 Cases arise in two ways, either as violation complaints26 or 
non-violation nullification or impairment complaints.27 In both cases, an 
aggrieved party must demonstrate that a trade benefit owed to it under WTO 
rules has been thwarted.28 Violation complaints are based on the claim that the 
offending government has enacted a measure that allegedly violates either a 
negotiated WTO commitment, such as a tariff rate, or a substantive rule, such 
as national treatment or non-discrimination against imports.29 In contrast, non-
violation cases arise when the measure enacted is not in itself a violation of 
WTO rules, but nonetheless undermines or conflicts with a member’s WTO 
obligations.30 Almost all WTO cases are violation complaints.31 
A. Consultations 
The preliminary step in the formal dispute settlement process is an attempt 
to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution through consultation and mediation.32 
It begins with a formal request by the complaining member nation for 
consultations “in good faith” within thirty days after the receipt of the 
request.33 If the parties cannot reach agreement through bilateral consultations, 
they may request the good offices of the WTO Director-General as mediator.34 
 
 25 WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 43. 
 26 Id. at 30. 
 27 Id. 
 28 The WTO term for this requirement of harm is nullification or impairment of a trade benefit. See 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
 29 See id. art. XXIII(1)(a). This type of case is commonly referred to as a violation case because the 
offending member government is accused of enacting a measure that is inconsistent with its WTO obligations 
in some way. WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 30–32. 
 30 See GATT, supra note 28, art. XXIII(1)(b). 
 31 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 185, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (quoting Panel Report, European Economic 
Community—Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed 
Proteins, L/6627 (Dec. 14, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (Jan. 25, 1990)). 
 32 DSU, supra note 9, art. 4(3). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. art. 5(6). 
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If no mutual solution arises in the consultations stage, the complaining member 
has the right to request the Dispute Settlement Body35 to establish a panel to 
hear and adjudicate the complaint.36 
The consultations stage is a reflection of the power-based methods that 
characterized much of the dispute settlement process under GATT.37 The WTO 
formalized a much more legalistic approach,38 but retained some aspects of the 
old system, such as consultations and mediation. While these informal methods 
can be valuable insofar as they advance judicial economy by resolving 
potential disputes amicably, they nonetheless present difficulties for 
developing nations. First, a negotiated solution is by its nature power-based. 
As a result, poorer and smaller developing nations are disadvantaged when 
they negotiate with more developed nations. In these cases, lack of economic 
power translates into a lack of bargaining power. Consultations are unlikely to 
yield favorable results39 for developing nations due to their inability to 
leverage political and economic power to their advantage. For instance, in two 
cases involving the Agreement of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
 
 35 The DSB oversees and implements all of the dispute settlement functions of the WTO. Understanding 
the WTO: Settling Disputes—A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). It consists of the same membership as the 
WTO General Council, the standing body of the WTO membership, although it follows its own procedures. 
See id. The DSB establishes panels, adopts panels’ reports automatically (in the absence of a reverse consensus 
not to adopt reports), is responsible for the implementation of panel rulings, and approves sanctions and 
retaliation for failure to comply with panel rulings. Id. For a detailed description of the WTO dispute 
settlement process, see id.; see also ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 116–26 (2009). 
 36 DSU, supra note 9, art. 4(7). 
 37 See Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 
29 INT’L L. 389, 399, 405–06 (1995). See generally ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 
66–70 (1997) (discussing the usage and justifications of power-oriented versus rule-oriented approaches for 
international trade dispute settlement); John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade 
System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE 93, 98–101 (1978) (detailing the distinction between power-based and rule-based 
diplomacy in trade). 
 38 Proponents of the legalistic model “argue that the necessity for certainty and predictability in the 
management of international business transactions calls for a more rule-oriented system.” Miquel Montañá 
Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 103, 129, 137–41 (1993) (discussing the “Improvements of 1989” as a harbinger for 
the eventual development of a more rule-oriented approach); see also Young, supra note 37, at 389–91 
(surveying dispute resolution advances made in the Uruguay Round). 
 39 See Request for Consultations by the United States, Argentina—Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals 
and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171/1 (May 10, 1999); Request for Consultations 
by the United States, Pakistan—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WT/DS36/1 (May 6, 1996); see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 
65, Apr. 15 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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Property Rights (“TRIPS”), the United States, and the European Union (“EU”) 
were able to obtain results in consultations that exceeded the negotiated WTO 
obligations of two developing nations, Pakistan and Argentina.40 In both cases, 
the United States and the European Communities requested that the countries 
apply certain patent protection provisions of TRIPS for pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural chemicals as of the Agreement’s date of entry into force.41 
However, under Article 65 of TRIPS, developing countries received a 
minimum period of five years from the January 1, 1995 date of entry into force 
to implement TRIPS.42 In both cases, Pakistan and Argentina gave in after 
consultations and agreed to an earlier implementation period, even though they 
were not legally obligated to do so.43 Because consultations are held 
confidentially, it is not possible to know for certain why Pakistan and 
Argentina acceded to resolutions not only against their interests, but also 
exceeding their TRIPS obligations. However, one likely explanation is the 
implicit or explicit threat of unilateral retaliation by the United States under 
Section 301, which requires the U.S. Trade Representative to identify and 
impose sanctions on foreign nations that deny adequate intellectual property 
protection to U.S. companies.44 
 
 40 See Request for Consultations by the United States, Pakistan—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, supra note 43; cf. Request for Consultations by the United States, 
Argentina—Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, 
supra note 39. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 After consultations with the United States, Pakistan confirmed its obligations to implement patent 
protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products under TRIPS, retroactive to the start of the 
TRIPS Agreement on January 1, 1995. See Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution, Pakistan—Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS36/4 (Mar. 7, 1997). Similarly, 
Argentina acceded to the position of the United States and the European Communities after consultations, 
adopting a solution identical to Pakistan. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the 
Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement, Argentina—Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data 
Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, Argentina—Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test 
Data, WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4 (June 20, 2002). 
 44 See 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000). The U.S. Trade Representative places nations under investigation, and 
hence under threat of sanctions, on a watch list. 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1, 3, 13, available at 
http://www.ipophil.gov.ph/document/3210ec2d_301Reports_2001.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2010). For 
developing nations, the typical sanction is removal from or curtailed access to the U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences (“GSP”), which gives the products of developing nations low or zero tariff entry into the United 
States. Id. at 2. Without GSP treatment, many developing nations’ exports would not be competitive in the 
U.S. market. See id. Therefore, the watch list is a potent threat. See id. For the entire length of the WTO 
process mentioned herein, the United States had placed Argentina on the Special 301 Priority Watch List. See 
id. The United States has in the past exercised the sanctions under Section 301—for example, in 1992, when it 
suspended India’s GSP privileges with respect to $80 million of its pharmaceutical exports. BARBARA LEITCH 
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Even worse, in some cases, consultations do not take place at all or if they 
do, only cursorily. For example, in the U.S.-Gambling case,45 the United States 
initially refused Antigua’s invitation to consult.46 After a second invitation, the 
United States subsequently engaged in a perfunctory one-hour consultation 
with Antigua in which the United States refused to discuss the possibility of 
resolving the dispute through a mutually satisfactory regulatory framework.47 
Antigua moved forward with a formal request for consultations and the case 
proceeded to trial.48 Antigua prevailed at both the panel and appellate body 
levels, only to face stonewalling from the United States at the remedies stage.49 
After years of American foot-dragging, Antigua resigned itself to a negotiated 
settlement that gave it a fraction of what it had wanted and won.50 
B. The Panel Process 
If consultations fail, the establishment of a panel initiates the formal 
adversarial stages of the dispute.51 The written request for a panel must 
indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at 
issue, and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint.52 The 
panel, comprised of three to five independent trade experts, then sets a 
timetable for proceedings, specifying deadlines for submissions of written 
statements by the parties and for meetings, the WTO equivalent of hearings.53 
After the first session of meetings, parties may provide the panel with 
 
LEPOER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB93097, INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS 14 (1998), available at http://fpc.state. 
gov/documents/organization/7930.pdf. 
 45 See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.-Gambling]; Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gambling]. 
 46 See Ewart, supra note 23, at 45. The Panel Report chastised the United States for its refusal to consult 
with Antigua. See Panel Report, U.S.-Gambling, supra note 45, ¶¶ 6.531, 6.608, 7.2. 
 47 See Ewart, supra note 23, at 45; see also Panel Report, U.S.-Gambling, supra note 45, ¶ 3.14. 
 48 See Panel Report, U.S.-Gambling, supra note 45, ¶ 3.79. 
 49 Antigua Threatens to Sanction US Over Internet Gaming Dispute, JAM. OBSERVER (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Antigua-threatens-to-sanction-US-over-Internet-gaming-
dispute_7775691; see also Statement on the Non-Compliance of the USA with the 2007 Ruling of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body as It Relates to the Provision of Remote (Internet) Gambling Services, CARIBBEAN 
COMMUNITY (CARICOM) SECRETARIAT (July 7, 2010), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/ 
meetings_statements/internet_gaming_31hgc_2010.jsp. 
 50 See Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007). 
 51 See DSU, supra note 9, art. 6. 
 52 Id. art. 6(2). 
 53 Id. art. 8. 
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supplemental submissions.54 Occasionally a second set of meetings may take 
place.55 Panels must make an objective assessment of the facts, the legal basis 
of a dispute, and the applicability of the covered agreements, and make other 
findings and recommendations that will assist the DSU in its ruling.56 
Panels are bound by the DSU to resolve disputes and issue a panel report 
within three months for cases of urgency and six months for general cases.57 
When the panel cannot issue a report within six months, it submits a formal 
request in writing for an extension to the DSB; this extension cannot exceed 
nine months from the establishment of the panel.58 However, in practice, the 
timeline is often extended beyond that and the panel can take as long as two 
years to issue a report.59 Panel reports, once issued, are automatically adopted 
by the DSB unless there is a consensus to block adoption of the report—a 
mechanism known as the “negative consensus rule.”60 
Developing nations face particular challenges in the panel stage as well. 
One potential problem—lack of sensitivity to the special concerns of 
development—is addressed by Article 8(10) of the DSU, which allows 
developing nations to insist that at least one panelist be a national of another 
developing country.61 However, a developing nation must formally request 
such a panel member.62 The appointment is not automatic, as some nations 
have insisted it ought to be.63 It is during the panel process that a developing 
nation’s comparative lack of financial resources, legal capacity, and human 
capital can be most damaging. WTO disputes are highly technical, complex to 
the point of opacity, and, in many cases, reliant on accurate and rigorous 
economic data and analysis.64 A developing nation’s lack of financial resources 
for the comprehensive pre-litigation collection of information and evidence on 
 
 54 Id. art. 12(6). 
 55 See id. app. 3, para. 12(d). 
 56 See id. art. 11. 
 57 See id. art. 12(8)–12(9). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See William Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 49 
(2005). 
 60 See DSU, supra note 9, art. 16(4); Yasuhei Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a 
Proceduralist, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (2009) (explaining the “the famous ‘negative consensus rule’ 
embodied in articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU”). 
 61 DSU, supra note 9, art. 8(10). Panelists serve in their individual capacities as trade experts, not as 
representatives of any country. Id. art. 8(9). 
 62 Id. art. 8(10). 
 63 See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, ¶ 4, TN/DS/W/17 (Oct. 9, 2002). 
 64 Bown & Hoekman, supra note 20, at 876. 
CAI GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011 9:50 AM 
2011] MAKING WTO REMEDIES WORK FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS 165 
the effects of WTO-inconsistent measures can seriously undermine the strength 
of its case before the panel.65 Indeed, pre-litigation research is an area in which 
non-governmental organizations and private industry groups can most assist 
developing nations by engaging in this type of critical pre-litigation 
preparation.66 Similarly, technical economic consulting services are essential to 
buttress certain claims fully, particularly in trade remedy investigations 
regarding claims such as dumping or countervailing duties, in which the 
economic proof of injury to imports underlies the legal analysis.67 Developing 
nations are less likely to either have qualified economists available internally 
or be able to afford to hire them.68 
Panels’ lack of adherence to the timelines set forth in the DSU also harms 
developing nations severely. Delays, of course, frustrate everyone. However, 
in some cases, delays can be used as a tactical advantage. The United States 
has shown itself to be especially adept at using delays to its advantage.69 Even 
when not deliberately pursued as a litigation strategy, delays can cause 
disproportionate harm to developing nations for two reasons. First, developing 
nations often rely on one or two industries for the bulk of their export 
income.70 For example, in the U.S.-Gambling case, the Internet gambling 
industry in Antigua, which otherwise relied on tourism—much disrupted by 
recent hurricanes—as its other major source of income, was vital to the 
nation’s economic survival.71 For the entire three-year duration of the case, 
Antigua had no access to the United States, the largest Internet gambling 
market in the world.72 To an economy highly dependent on one or two 
 
 65 See id. at 883. 
 66 See id. at 883, 887. 
 67 Id. at 866, 876. 
 68 See id. at 875–76 (pointing out that the lack of professional economists on the staff of the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law is a serious limit on its ability to provide meaningful legal assistance to developing 
nations). 
 69 See, e.g., Turab Hussain, Victory in Principle, Pakistan’s Dispute Settlement Case on Combed Cotton 
Yarn Exports to the United States, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ 
casestudies_e/case34_e.htm (last visited Feb 23, 2011) (discussing Panel Report, United States—Transitional 
Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WT/DS192/R (May 31, 2001)). 
 70 See, e.g., id. (“The importance of the textile sector, often referred to as the backbone of the Pakistan 
economy, cannot be overstated. It is the country’s largest manufacturing sector with an 8.5% share in the 
nation’s GDP. The sector’s contribution to employment is 38% and it generates a phenomenal 60% of the total 
export earnings of Pakistan.”) 
 71 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 24 June 
2003, ¶¶ 42–44, WT/DSB/M/151 (Aug. 12, 2003). 
 72 A 2005 statement by Christiansen Capital Advisors, which follows Internet gambling trends, valued 
the Internet gambling industry at $5.5 billion and estimated that “of the 12 million people who gamble yearly 
on the Internet, some 7.5 million live in the United States.” See Garry Boulard, Trade Rules Gamble with State 
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industries, the delays in WTO dispute settlement can be economically 
crippling, as there are no temporary remedies under the WTO. Second, delays 
strain already thin resources dedicated to dispute settlement, making the costs 
of bringing a WTO case disproportionately high for a developing nation. While 
potential delays lurk in every stage of the process, panels should, at a 
minimum, strive to comply with the six-month deadline when an essential 
industry or small economy is involved. 
C. The Appeal 
The DSU creates a standing panel of nine eminent trade experts, sitting in 
rotations of three, determined by the working procedures of the Appellate 
Body, to hear appeals from panel decisions.73 An appeal is limited to questions 
of law, as raised and developed by the panel.74 However, as a practical matter, 
the Appellate Body has undertaken an active role and often extends its purview 
to legal issues or arguments not raised by the panel.75 This is because there is 
no remand mechanism in the WTO.76 Thus, the Appellate Body must fully 
resolve the dispute before it, which means it must fully complete the analysis 
in exercising its authority to uphold, reverse, or modify the panel decision.77 
The Appellate Body is also bound to issue its decisions within sixty days, but 
make take up to ninety days if it submits a request and receives an extension 
from the DSU.78 Similar to its treatment of panel reports, the DSB 
automatically adopts and implements Appellate Body decisions unless there is 
a consensus to block the decision.79 
 
Laws, ST. LEGISLATURES, Oct.–Nov. 2005, at 19, 20 (focusing on Antigua’s perception that new U.S. laws 
regulating the cross-border Internet gambling industry were integral to its attempts to diversify its economy 
away from reliance on a struggling tourism sector). 
 73 DSU, supra note 9, art. 17(1). 
 74 Id. art. 17(6). 
 75 See, e.g., Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial 
Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 273–74 (2008) (citing fifty-one articles 
in U.S. and Canadian law journals that discuss expansive or “activist judicial lawmaking” by the WTO). 
 76 Alan Yanovich & Tania Voon, Completing the Analysis in WTO Appeals: The Practice and Its 
Limitations, 9 INT’L J. ECON. L. 933, 937–38, 942 (2006) (citing frequent proposals by WTO members to 
introduce remand mechanism into WTO disputes). 
 77 DSU, supra note 9, art. 17(13). 
 78 Id. art. 17(5). 
 79 Id. art. 17(14). 
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D. Implementation and Enforcement Mechanism 
If a panel or Appellate Body report finds a measure to be inconsistent with 
WTO rules, the offending member must “bring the measure into conformity” 
with its WTO obligations.80 Although a report may recommend ways to 
comply, a WTO member retains final say on the method.81 As discussed in 
greater detail in Part III.A, the preferred method of implementation is usually 
withdrawal of the measure. At this point, the DSB formally takes over the role 
of overseeing implementation.82 The DSB holds a meeting thirty days after 
adoption of the report, in which the losing party must indicate how it will 
implement the report within a reasonable time.83 The reasonable time for 
implementation may be reached by mutual agreement or by arbitration, if the 
DSB approves this time period.84 The DSB also undertakes surveillance of 
compliance both beginning with a compliance review six months after the 
reasonable period of time is set and continuing until the matter is resolved.85 
Sometimes the parties will not agree on whether the steps taken by the 
losing party constitute full compliance. In such cases, a panel may be 
constituted to adjudicate the question.86 Generally, the compliance panel is the 
same as the original panel.87 Once again, the panel’s decisions may be 
appealed to the Appellate Body.88 Multiple rounds of compliance panels are 
possible.89 
If the offending party fails to bring a measure into conformity or implement 
the recommendations of the DSB, the injured party is allowed to seek 
additional remedies.90 The remedies are, in order of preference: compensation; 
suspension of concessions of the same sector in the same agreement; 
 
 80 Id. art. 19(1). 
 81 See id. 
 82 The DSB administers the entire dispute settlement process, establishing panels and adopting panel and 
Appellate Body reports. DSU, supra note 9, art. 2(1). It also monitors the implementation of rulings and may 
authorize the suspension of obligations under the relevant agreements. See WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 
17. 
 83 DSU, supra note 9, art. 21(3). 
 84 Id. art. 21(3)(a)–(c). 
 85 Id. art. 21(6). 
 86 Id. art. 21(5). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. arts. 21(5), 17(1). 
 89 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products: Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United 
States, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 (Dec. 20, 2002). 
 90 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(3). 
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suspension of different sectors in the same agreement; and suspension under an 
entirely different agreement.91 The parties must first enter into negotiations to 
determine mutually acceptable compensation.92 If they are unable to agree 
within twenty days after the reasonable time period expires, the injured party is 
authorized to request permission from the DSB to suspend concessions or to 
impose countermeasures equal to the amount of injury suffered by the losing 
party.93 
The next Part discusses in detail each of the remedies and critiques their 
effectiveness for developing nations. Suffice it to point out here that the multi-
stage implementation process creates opportunities of further delays that can 
severely disadvantage a developing nation party. For example, in the U.S.-
Gambling case, the compliance proceedings were plagued by the same delays 
detailed above with respect to the panel proceedings, causing economic 
disadvantage to Antigua.94 Three years after Antigua began the dispute with its 
original, spurned request for initial consultation, Antigua sought a compliance 
panel.95 This began afresh the cycle of consultation,96 panel, and possible 
appeal. On the question of whether the United States had complied with the 
WTO rulings, the United States and Antigua held nominal consultations that 
lasted for fifteen minutes.97 Subsequently, Antigua requested that the DSB 
form a compliance panel.98 Once again, the panel found in Antigua’s favor and 
ruled that the United States had not complied with the WTO ruling, giving 
Antigua permission to unilaterally impose sanctions against the United 
States.99 For a small economy like Antigua, the right to impose sanctions is 
theoretical at best. Meanwhile, from the initial consultations on March 13, 
2003, to March 30, 2007, at which time the compliance panel gave Antigua 
permission to impose sanctions, Antigua had no access to the lucrative U.S. 
 
 91 Id. art. 22(2)–22(3)(c). 
 92 Id. art. 22(2). 
 93 Id. art. 22(2)–22(4). 
 94 See supra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
 95 Agreement Between Antigua and Barbuda and the United States Regarding Procedures under Article 
21 and 22 of the DSU, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, arts. 2, 7, WT/DS285/16 (May 24, 2006). Antigua began this dispute in 2003. See Dispute Settlement 
Body, Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 24 June 2003, supra note 71. 
 96 See Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/17 (June 12, 2006). 
 97 See Ewart, supra note 23, at 56–57. 
 98 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—Measures Affecting 
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/18 (July 7, 2006). 
 99 See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 6.85, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007). 
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Internet gambling market, and Antigua’s economy suffered significant revenue 
loss as a result.100 During that time, the United States had taken no action to 
remedy the WTO violation.101 As Antigua pointed out, it was the first time in 
the history of the WTO that a country was called to justify itself before a 
compliance panel when it had done absolutely nothing to comply with a 
ruling.102 
III.  EXISTING WTO REMEDIES 
Current WTO remedies are, in order: cessation or withdrawal; voluntary 
compensation; DSB-imposed or non-voluntary suspension of concessions; and 
other obligations.103 The ideal result in any WTO dispute is the cessation or 
withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measure.104 If this occurs, no other 
remedies are available. If cessation or withdrawal does not occur, then the 
other remedies of compensation or concessions under the agreement may be 
exercised, but only after withdrawal fails to remedy the problem.105 This Part 
examines each remedy with a focus on the ways in which each remedy is 
problematic for developing nations. 
A. Cessation 
Losers in WTO disputes have to bring the offending measure into 
compliance with WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time.106 While 
the DSB, in adopting panel or appellate body reports, may recommend ways to 
accomplish this, sovereignty is preserved by vesting ultimate discretion with 
the member nation in selecting the means of implementation most consistent 
with its national law and processes.107 Cessation or withdrawal of the WTO-
 
 100 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
 101 Indeed, the only action undertaken by the United States could be said to have worsened the situation 
for Antigua. In December 2006, the United States enacted new legislation that criminalized the use of credit 
cards to pay for online betting transactions. Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
347, §§ 801–02, 31 U.S.C. 5301 (2006) (exempting gambling activities permitted by the states on Native 
American Territory, as well as horse racing). 
 102 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William Rappard on 21 April 2006, 
¶ 38, WT/DSB/M/210 (May 30, 2006). 
 103 DSU, supra note 9, art. 3(7). 
 104 Id. (providing that “[i]n the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned”). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. arts. 19(1), 21(3). 
 107 See id. arts. 19(1)–19(2), 22(9). 
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inconsistent measure is the favored solution.108 However, it is also possible to 
amend, modify, or supplement the affected measure or law to bring it into 
compliance.109 
Favoring cessation as the preferred WTO remedy is consistent with general 
international law. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility (“DASR”) issued 
by the United Nations International Law Commission,110 which serve a similar 
function to the American Law Institute in the drafting of Restatements,111 
affirm that a state is required to cease its violation of its international 
obligations.112 However, the DASR also recognize that a state may choose to 
comply in greater or lesser ways than cessation.113 
Cessation, on its own, however, is unsatisfactory as a remedy. As 
previously noted, cessation, once implemented, forecloses the possibility of 
other remedies. That is problematic because cessation is a purely prospective 
remedy.114 It does not advance or serve any values of a remedies system other 
than prospective removal of a violation. To take a simple domestic law 
analogy, this would be like telling a convicted embezzler to stop embezzling in 
 
 108 The WTO term for this is implementation. The preference for implementation is explicit in Article 
22(1). “However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to 
full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.” 
Id. art. 22(1); see also supra text accompanying note 106. 
 109 DSU, supra note 9, art. 17(13). The Appellate Body has the power to modify any panel decisions. Id. 
 110 Int’l Law Comm’n, State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, art. 30, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1; GAOR, 53d Sess., (July 26, 2001) [hereinafter DASR]. See generally Rep. of the 
Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10 (2001). 
 111 About ALI: Institute Projects, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instituteprojects 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 112 DASR, supra note 110, art. 30. Both panel reports and arbitrators’ reports explicitly referenced the 
DASR, treating them as a reflection of customary international law. As such, they are relevant to WTO bodies 
as a supplementary means of interpretation of WTO law. See Decision of the Arbitrator, United States—Tax 
Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” ¶ 4.7, WT/DS108/Arb (Aug. 30, 2002); Panel Report, United 
States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” ¶ 4.570, WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999). 
 113 See DASR, supra note 110, arts. 31, 55. 
 114 Some panels have tried to impose retroactive remedies, but they were unsuccessful. It is now 
established that cessation is a purely prospective remedy. Cf. Gavin Goh & Andreas R. Ziegler, Retrospective 
Remedies in the WTO After Automotive Leather, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 545, 548 (2003). But see Panel Report, 
Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/RW (Jan. 21, 
2000) (holding that Article 19(1) of the DSU does not limit remedies under Article 4.7 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) Agreement to purely prospective action). In that case, both the United 
States and Australia argued against the retrospective component of this decision, and some member states 
severely criticized the panel report. See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre 
William Rappard on 11 February 2000, 5–7, WT/DSB/M/75 (Mar. 7, 2000). 
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the future, without making restitution to the victims, paying a fine, serving a 
jail sentence, or even being removed from his or her job. One can easily see 
that such a remedy does not advance values of equity and justice,115 restitution, 
punishment, or deterrence. Similarly, from a quantitative point of view, 
cessation is less than proportional and less than equivalent to an objective 
measure of damages. Indeed, no calculation of damages plays a part. Thus, in 
the WTO context, the injured party receives no recompense for lost revenue, 
profits, or trade volume. The multilateral trade system, as a whole, is 
unchanged, other than a return to a pre-violation status quo and the setting of a 
legal precedent.116 Nor is the case likely to have great deterrent effect on 
others, as there are no punitive or compulsory elements to the remedy.117 
The WTO justification for this approach is founded on laissez-faire 
principles—cessation has the smallest impact on the trading system. It does no 
more than restore the status quo ante. Any more than that would introduce a 
new element of imbalance into the trading system. 
B. Compensation 
The remedy of compensation in the WTO is not the payment of monetary 
damages, as the term would ordinarily imply. Rather, it is the granting of 
additional trade benefits—such as favorable tariff terms—to the injured 
party.118 For example, the offending nation might agree to extend zero or low 
tariffs to the imports of the aggrieved nation. Such low tariffs would lead to 
increased trade flows, which would provide a financial benefit or 
compensation to the injured party. Compensation is a voluntary arrangement, 
to which both parties agree under consultation.119 It is meant to be temporary, 
with the view of inducing the offending party to bring its measures and laws 
into compliance with WTO rules.120 
 
 115 See Trachtman, supra note 11, at 132 (noting that cessation “is not necessarily associated with either 
justice or efficiency except under an assumption that WTO law is consistent with justice or efficiency”). 
 116 The WTO does not officially recognize precedent as such. However, GATT and WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body have developed a practice of deferring to prior decisions and using them as guidance. Palmeter 
& Mavroidis, supra note 10, at 400. 
 117 See Mavroidis, supra note 11, at 812. 
 118 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(2)–22(3). 
 119 Id. art. 22(1). 
 120 Id. 
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Compensation has been used only once since the creation of the WTO in 
1995.121 Various explanations account for the infrequency of use. First, it is 
voluntary and must be negotiated.122 Agreement on the level and scope of 
compensation has proven difficult.123 Second, it is unclear if the country 
offering compensatory concessions or favorable treatment would have to 
extend such benefits to other WTO systems on a most-favored-nation (“MFN”) 
basis, as required under Article 1 of the GATT.124 The source of the 
uncertainty is the requirement that remedies have to be consistent with the 
covered agreement, which includes MFN obligations.125 Nations are 
understandably hesitant to agree to compensation if it has to be extended to all 
other WTO members on an MFN basis because such a remedy would be 
completely disproportionate to the violation. This might explain why 
suspension of concessions is more common—it is authorized only for the 
injured party and not on a MFN basis.126 
Due to the uncertainties around compensation and the infrequency of its 
use, it is little more than a theoretical remedy at this point. There have been 
some proposals to improve and strengthen compensation as a remedy. For 
example, one scholar has proposed setting out or pre-negotiating the types of 
compensation available as a way to bypass the bilateral deadlock that often 
mars compensation negotiations.127 Others have suggested expanding the 
compensation remedy to include retroactive and prospective fines or other 
monetary compensation, which would give it more teeth.128 However, these 
proposals, while helpful, do not alter the underlying lack of incentive for 
developing nations to bring suits before the WTO. 
 
 121 William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119, 122 
(2009); see, e.g., Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for Implementation, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, WT/DS8/17/Add.1 (Jan. 12, 1998) (providing autonomous tariff reduction). 
 122 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(1). 
 123 Negotiated compensation talks usually fail. 1 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1365–66 (Patrick F. Macrory et al. eds., 2005). 
 124 GATT, supra note 28, art. 1. Most-favored-nation status is one of the most important underlying 
principles of the multilateral trading system, a principle of non-discrimination that requires a WTO member to 
give equal treatment in trade advantages to all other members of the WTO. See id. 
 125 DSU, supra note 9, art. 3(5). 
 126 Id. art. 22(6). 
 127 See LAWRENCE, supra note 11, at 10–11 (proposing a system of pre-negotiated “contingent 
liberalization commitments”). 
 128 See generally Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: 
Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005); Victor Mosoti, Comment, 
In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Process; A View from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 231 (2001). 
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C. Suspension of Concessions or Retaliation 
If the reasonable period of time for compliance has lapsed and the parties 
cannot agree on compensation, then the aggrieved party may seek 
authorization129 from the DSB to suspend concessions—in other words, to 
temporarily revoke trade concessions granted to the offending party.130 This 
type of retaliation must be specifically requested and can be used only by 
parties directly involved in the dispute as complaints and interested third 
parties.131 In other words, it is clear that it is not available on a MFN basis. 
The level of suspension authorized by the DSB must be “equivalent” to the 
nullification or impairment (harm) suffered by the aggrieved party.132 The 
remedy is only prospective—it extends forward only for the period of time 
authorized by the DSB for the recouping of “equivalent” harm. It does not 
cover the period in which the offending measure was in place or even for the 
duration of the dispute. 
Suspension of concessions or retaliation can take three forms, in a strict 
order of preference, as dictated by the DSU. Retaliation, also referred to as 
countermeasures, must take place in the same sector133 in which the offending 
violation occurs.134 Thus, if the underlying dispute is related to Country A’s 
discriminatory treatment of automobile parts from Country B, Country B may 
impose countermeasures on automobile parts imports of Country A in 
retaliation. Obviously, sometimes this is not feasible. Country A might not 
produce or export any auto parts. In such cases, it is possible to impose 
 
 129 Retaliation is allowed only with prior DSB authorization. However, some members and trade experts 
have argued that Articles 8(2) and 8(3) of the Agreement on Safeguards provide an exception that allows the 
suspension of concessions immediately after the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report without prior 
authorization. See WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 81 n.97. 
 130 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(2). 
 131 See id. 
 132 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(4). 
 133 There are three sectors recognized by the WTO, each corresponding to one of the three substantive 
annexes to the WTO Agreement. They are goods, services, and intellectual property. Each is governed, 
respectively, by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (Annex 1A), General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (Annex 1B), and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (Annex 1C). DSU, supra note 9, art. 
22(3)(f). Within these three major sectors, all trade in goods falls into one sector. Id. art. 22(3)(f)(i). Within the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and TRIPS agreements, sectors are further subdivided. For 
purposes of dispute settlement, “sector” in GATS and TRIPS refers to the secondary sectors recognized under 
these agreements. Id. art. 22(3)(f)(ii)–(iii). Thus, for example, the response to a violation in the “sector” of 
patents should be limited to patents. See also WTO HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 82. 
 134 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(3)(a). 
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retaliation in a different sector covered by the same agreement.135 The WTO 
recognizes three sectors: goods, services, and intellectual property.136 In our 
example, Country B may choose to impose its countermeasures on the 
agricultural imports of Country A into Country B. As both automobile parts 
and agricultural products are goods covered by the same agreement—GATT—
this would be the second best option.137 The third option is cross-retaliation, or 
the imposition of countermeasures on a different sector covered by another 
agreement.138 In our example above, it might entail a response by Country B 
against the intellectual property or services trade of Country A. This response 
is allowed only if the first two options are impracticable or ineffective in order 
to avoid trade-restricting spillover effects into other sectors of trade.139 
Even though cross-retaliation is a remedy of last resort, its availability is 
particularly important for small economies, which may not benefit from the 
other two types of countermeasures. A country that engages in a limited 
volume of trade, in only a few sectors, may not, as a practical matter, be able to 
make use of same-sector retaliation. For example, in Ecuador’s case against the 
European Communities in EC-Bananas III,140 the remedy of imposing 
countermeasures on imports of European bananas would have been illusory. 
Similarly, it was likely to do the Ecuadorian economy more harm than good to 
impose countermeasures on other imported European goods141 on which 
Ecuadorian industries and consumers depend. Doing so may have crippled 
segments of the Ecuadorian economy by depriving industry and consumers of 
 
 135 Id. art. 22(3)(b). 
 136 Id. art. 22(3)(f). 
 137 See DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(3)(b). In a TRIPS dispute, this would entail the imposition of 
countermeasures on copyrights or trademarks in an underlying patent dispute. 
 138 Id. art. 22(3)(c). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Ecuador—Decision of 
Arbitrators]. Ecuador’s level of nullification or impairment attributed to the offending EC regime was 
calculated at $201.6 million per year. Id. ¶ 170. The arbitrators, in an Article 22(6) decision, authorized 
Ecuador to suspend concessions under both GATS and TRIPS for that amount. Id. ¶ 173(a). Ecuador 
subsequently faced significant problems in utilizing rights to retaliate against the European Communities. For 
example, the arbitrators specifically stated that they could not determine equivalence beyond trade in goods 
and services under Articles 22(6) and 22(7). Id. ¶ 159. Therefore, the arbitrators could not estimate the 
magnitude of non-compliance with TRIPS. Id. Furthermore, the arbitrators did not consider lost profits as part 
of their calculation, which further limited Ecuador’s access to proportionate redress. Id. ¶ 160 n.52. “It is 
rumored that Ecuador was granted certain non-WTO benefits in order to settle this case informally.” See 
Trachtman, supra note 11, at 139. 
 141 Suspension of concessions in such a case would likely lead to a decrease in supply or an increase in 
prices of the affected goods. 
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critical goods and materials. As a matter of necessity, Ecuador was authorized 
to suspend concessions on European trade of services and intellectual property 
under GATS and TRIPS, respectively.142 
There is another reason why cross-retaliation is an important remedy for 
smaller and developing nations. Even when it is possible to impose same sector 
countermeasures, doing so may not be effective due to asymmetries in trade 
flows. Developing nations may not trade in imported goods in sufficient 
quantities for a suspension of concessions in those areas to be felt by exporters 
in the offending nation, especially if the opposing party is a developed nation. 
For example, it would not make sense for Ecuador to impose trade sanctions 
on European fruit imports into Ecuador. Furthermore, an authorization to 
Ecuador to impose sanctions on other common European goods—such as 
electronics, cosmetic products, and wines—is unlikely to be felt by Europe due 
to the low volume of Ecuadorian trade in such products. In such a situation, the 
ultimate goal of retaliation, to compel compliance in the form of cessation, 
would not be advanced. When trade volumes in the affected sector are 
negligible, the impact of retaliation is likewise negligible. Thus, cross-
retaliation may be the only means to advance compliance. 
Retaliation is very rarely used. In the thirteen years since the formation of 
WTO, and in the course of over four hundred cases, countermeasures have 
been authorized in only eight cases.143 Of these, very few have involved 
developing nations.144 Because resort to countermeasures is quite rare, it serves 
primarily a threatening function. The possibility of retaliation is used as a 
bargaining chip to force implementation. Of course, for it to be useful as a 
threat, the level of retaliation needs to be painful enough to have persuasive 
power. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical bases for retaliation, especially for 
developing nations, it is also imperfect as a remedy. Fundamentally, retaliation 
is at odds with the WTO’s underlying trade liberalization philosophy. 
Retaliation is no more than the sanctioned imposition of a new trade barrier in 
 
 142 Ecuador—Decision of Arbitrators, supra note 140, ¶ 173. 
 143 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 58 (2008). 
 144 See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB1 
(Aug. 31, 2009). See generally Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, Auctioning 
Countermeasures in the WTO, 73 J. INT’L ECON. 309 (2007). 
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response to an unauthorized trade barrier.145 The remedy is as trade-restricting 
as the violation. Moreover, retaliation comes at a cost not only to the trading 
system as a whole, but also to the nation imposing the measure as well as the 
one suffering it. Both bear economic losses, perhaps unevenly. Lastly, it is 
unclear if retaliation is compatible with the goal of promoting compliance in 
the form of cessation or other implementation of DSB recommendations. On 
one hand, it is clear that such implementation is the ultimate goal because the 
DSB will monitor retaliation until it is achieved.146 On the other, retaliation can 
also be viewed as running counter to the goal because the offending member 
can simply choose to “pay the price” and accept retaliation.147 The potential 
results of retaliation can thus be twofold. First, implementation and a 
restoration of the status quo prior to the violation might not occur. Second, 
retaliation introduces a new balance of trade, at lower and less liberal levels. 
For these reasons, retaliation is perhaps the most problematic of the WTO 
remedies.148 
IV.  NEW PROPOSAL: CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS 
The greatest shortcoming of the existing proposals for reform is that they 
all require an amendment to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding. As 
any amendment requires a two-thirds majority vote of all 153 WTO members, 
the process seems unlikely in light of Doha Round tensions and deadlocks.149 
Even if it were likely, it would not occur very quickly as each member would 
need to approve the amendment per its own national processes.150 Meanwhile, 
disenchantment with the WTO dispute settlement system on the part of its 
developing nation members will continue to grow, deepening existing rifts in 
Doha. Therefore, for practical reasons, this Article eschews proposals that 
require amendments to the DSU. 
 
 145 The Process—Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s10p1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
 146 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(8). 
 147 John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply 
or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 121–22 (2004) (arguing that retaliation does little to advance 
rebalancing in trade relations). 
 148 MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 94 
(2003). 
 149 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 10(3), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 150 See THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
123, at 85. 
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This Article suggests the use of a litigation strategy for developing nations 
that relies on a quasi “class action” model. Developing nations would be 
allowed freer rein to exercise existing third-party rights in a manner that allows 
them to pool their complaints in cases against developed nations. The primary 
mechanism for this exercise of third-party rights is the regular joinder or 
multiple complainants provision (Article 9), which is already part of the 
DSU.151 However, the strategy would be strengthened by procedural changes 
to the right to join as a third party under Article 10,152 such as making the right 
automatic, upon notification to the DSB, for least-developed countries.153 
WTO members could implement the strategy unilaterally, although its 
effectiveness would be enhanced by minor procedural modifications. Only 
minimal changes would be necessary. The first would be simply more frequent 
invocation of the existing joinder and third-party provisions of the DSU. That 
too could be done unilaterally without the need for an amendment to the DSU, 
pursuant to the proposed litigation strategy. The proposal envisages groups of 
developing nations, led by a larger or middle-income developing nation, such 
as Mexico, India, China, or Brazil, banding together as complainants in order 
to aggregate their WTO grievances and more effectively exercise remedies. 
The most important change would be the ability to trade countermeasures 
within the class. 
A. The Strategy Is Supported by WTO Text 
As we have seen, the DSU contemplates the consolidation of cases to be 
adjudicated by one panel.154 WTO practice also confirms that the mechanism is 
often invoked by WTO members across a variety of substantive areas.155 What 
about the ability to trade countermeasures among the class? As this is critical 
to the strategy’s success, it is indispensable to find some textual basis for the 
proposition. Here, the vagueness of the remedies provisions of the DSU is 
beneficial. 
 
 151 DSU, supra note 9, art. 9. Article 9 allows the consolidation of multiple cases concerning the same 
matter into one complainant to be handled by a single panel. Id. art. 9(1). Each complainant has the same rights 
under the DSU as if the complainant had been filed separately. “The single panel shall organize its 
examination and present its finding to the DSB in such a manner that the rights which the parties to the dispute 
would have enjoyed had separate panels examined the complaints are in no way impaired.” Id. art. 9(2). 
 152 See id. art. 10. 
 153 This and other procedural improvements are elaborated in greater detail in Part IV. 
 154 DSU, supra note 9, art. 9. 
 155 See THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
123, at 1203 n.17.  
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The only guidance that the DSU provides with respect to the calculation of 
remedies is Article 22(4), which provides that “[t]he level of the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to 
the level of the nullification or impairment.”156 So long as the total amount of 
retaliation does not exceed the level of equivalence, there is no direct conflict 
with the DSU. The DSU is silent on the allocation of countermeasures or 
retaliation among multiple complainants.157 The only other relevant provision 
in the DSU is Article 22(6), which specifies that countermeasures are specific 
to the nation upon which they are imposed—that is, they are not applied on a 
MFN basis.158 Again, the strategy proposed in this Article does not conflict 
with the DSU because the countermeasures would be imposed only on the 
offending party in the case.159 Given the scant guidance from the DSU, there is 
a lot of flexibility in the exercise of remedies, so long as there is no conflict 
with other WTO agreements. 
It is also possible to give positive support for the strategy in the form of 
guidelines, decisions, and judicial interpretations that give more content to the 
vague remedies provisions in the DSU. WTO law has evolved from GATT 
practice, and the DSU requires that WTO practice align with prior GATT 
practice.160 GATT practice incorporates many interpretations, guidelines, and 
procedures that were not based on GATT text. Many of these were preserved 
as WTO practice. Thus, there is a long tradition of acts taken as interpretations 
or procedures that, over time, were hallowed into custom and accepted 
 
 156 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(4). The only exception to this statement, which is not relevant to the subject 
of this Article, may be export subsidies. Some arbitral panels have found that language in the SCM Agreement 
provides a special regime for remedies in response to export subsidies. See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, 
Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶¶ 3.54–3.60, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000); Decision 
of the Arbitrator, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 
30, 2002). 
 157 There is a potential conflict with the requirement of Article 9, which accords complainants all of the 
same rights they would have in an individual complainant. However, this conflict can be resolved in two ways. 
First, one can argue that the rights themselves are unaffected—only the exercise of those rights is affected. The 
right to grant the exercise of countermeasures to a co-complainant is not so different from the situation in 
which the exercise of the right would be meaningless anyway, as in the case of a small developing nation. 
Second, one can rely on the application of the doctrine of pare in parem. See, e.g., ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, 
THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 181 (2008). This principle is enshrined in general international law in the principle of 
sovereign immunity. See JAN WILLISCH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TECHNICAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 19 (1987). 
 158 DSU, supra note 9, art. 22(6). 
 159 In this respect, the proposed strategy is different from the auctioning proposal advanced by Bagwell, 
Mavroidis, and Staiger. See generally Bagwell, Mavroidis & Staiger, supra note 144. 
 160 DSU, supra note 9, art. 3(1). 
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practice. As a practical matter, many of the customs evolved from the practices 
of developed nations, which have always been more active in shaping the 
WTO system.161 Now that so many developing nations are WTO members,162 
the time is ripe for them to contribute to the tradition. 
Additionally, there is support for clarifying existing WTO text with 
guidelines, decisions, or interpretations without amending the text. For 
example, the European Communities have proposed a number of ways to 
improve the functioning of existing special and differential treatment for 
developing nations through guidelines, decisions, or interpretations.163 The 
common denominator of the EU proposals is that they eschew amendments in 
favor of clarifying, softer approaches. 
B. The Strategy in Action 
Let us formulate a hypothetical to see how the strategy would actually 
work. Assume that a number of corn-producing and exporting nations, 
including Brazil, contemplate a challenge to U.S. corn subsidies as inconsistent 
with both the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.164 Among this group are a number of smaller 
nations, including active corn exporters like Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, 
and Romania,165 which are unlikely to pursue complaints independently. They 
may be discouraged by the length and cost of WTO litigation, as well as by 
their lack of prior experience and legal expertise in the area. They may not 
 
 161 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries in 
from the Cold, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 7–9 (Bernard Hoekman & 
Will Martin eds., 2001) (noting that rich countries sometimes play down the political imbalances within 
developing countries); see also Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the 
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance 
Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 419–20 (2001) (recognizing the special 
needs of developing countries in the WTO agreements and arguing that the absence of standards, which is 
perpetuated by a minority of powerful countries, poses a threat to the security of the entire international trade 
system). 
 162 Developing countries comprise the majority of WTO members. Understanding the WTO: Developing 
Countries—Overview, supra note 6. 
 163 The WTO Work Programme on Special and Differential Treatment—Some EU Ideas for the Way 
Ahead, at 5–7 [hereinafter EU Proposals], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/june/tradoc_ 
111244.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
 164 This Author has previously argued that in the aftermath of Brazil’s victory in the U.S.-Upland Cotton 
case, the lack of meaningful reforms in the 2007 Farm Bill, and the current Doha deadlock, such a case is 
extremely likely. See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Think Big and Ignore the Law: U.S. Corn and Ethanol Subsidies and 
WTO Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 865, 866 (2009). 
 165 Briefing Rooms–Corn: Trade, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/corn/trade.htm 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
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engage in a sufficient volume of trade to justify the expense and time. They 
may also fear the possibility of unilateral retaliation by the United States, either 
through a decrease in development or military aid or by revoking access to the 
Generalized System of Preferences, which grants them preferential trade terms 
as developing nations.166 Lastly, the lack of meaningful remedies may be the 
ultimate deterrent. Any threat of retaliation by them against a giant like the 
United States would sound hollow. As small players in the world economy, 
they will not to be able to inflict enough pain through retaliation to force 
compliance with WTO recommendations should they prevail.167 
In such a case, collective action is necessary. Ukraine and Romania are not 
likely to file a complaint individually. In fact, even if they were to act together, 
their combined market power would not be sufficient against the United States 
to amount to a meaningful threat of retaliation. They also do not conduct 
enough trade volume with the United States,168 across all sectors of goods, 
services, and intellectual property, to be able to exert the level of pressure 
sufficient to force the powerful U.S. corn and ethanol industries to urge 
compliance by withdrawal of the offending subsidies. 
In contrast, Brazil may be able to exert enough pressure on the United 
States. As the world’s eighth-largest economy,169 a close trading partner of the 
United States, and a seasoned player in WTO dispute settlement,170 Brazil’s 
situation is markedly different. 
 
 166 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 20, at 863. 
 167 Bown and Hoekman explain this well in economic terms: 
[O]n the import side, potential developing country complainants are typically small consumers 
that are unable to affect world prices. Under the current ‘retaliation-as-compensation’ approach, 
this implies that they lack the capacity to impose the large political-economic welfare losses on 
potential respondent countries that would generate the internal political pressures in those 
countries that may be a necessary element to induce compliance with adverse DSU rulings. 
Id. 
 168 See Foreign Trade Statistics—Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports, and Trade Balance) with Romania, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4850.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2011); 
Foreign Trade Statistics—Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports, and Trade Balance) with Ukraine, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4623.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 169 Economy size is here measured by gross domestic product. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName 
=Brazil&countryCode=br&regionCode=sa&rank=10#br (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 170 Brazil has been relatively active in dispute settlement. As a complainant, it has brought cases against 
the United States, the EU, Canada, the Netherlands, Argentina, Peru, and Turkey. It has brought twenty-five 
cases as a complainant and has been involved in fourteen cases as a respondent. Disputes by 
Country/Territory, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e. 
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V. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PROPOSED CLASS ACTION STRATEGY 
There are a number of ways to evaluate the merits and drawbacks of this 
proposed class action litigation strategy. This Part presents the major 
evaluative criteria in six categories and offers an assessment of how the 
proposal fares in each criterion. First, how workable is the strategy as a 
practical matter and how likely is it to be adopted by developing nations? 
Related to this point, one must consider the obstacles to adoption developing 
nations face. Second, does the proposal contribute to the functioning of the 
WTO dispute settlement system as whole? Third, does the proposal advance or 
impede the multilateral trade negotiation process? Are there political costs to 
the strategy that might play out in the Doha Round and other negotiation 
processes? Related to this point, what are the challenges governments will face 
in implementing and overseeing this strategy in terms of loss of autonomy, 
settlement possibilities, and conflicts of interests? Fifth, what are the legal 
obstacles to implementation, both in terms of WTO law and domestic legal 
processes? Sixth, what are the broader implications of the proposal for public-
private cooperation, including the participation of civil society actors in trade 
policy? In summary, the evaluative criteria are: (1) practicability; (2) systemic 
contribution; (3) impact on negotiations or the political implications of the 
proposal; (4) governmental coordination difficulties; (5) legal obstacles; and 
(6) public-private interaction. 
A. Practicability 
1. Benefits 
The first criterion to evaluate is how practicable the proposed litigation 
strategy is in light of a number of factors. This Subpart begins by contrasting 
the reasons for the adoption of the strategy with the reasons against adoption. It 
then considers the major practical impediments against implementation of the 
strategy. 
The primary reasons for developing nations to embrace collective litigation 
are strategic, political, and systemic. Strategically, class actions enhance the 
likelihood of achieving a positive outcome. Recall that the ultimate goal of 
dispute settlement in the WTO is to compel violators to prospectively 
withdraw offending measures, thereby restoring the status quo prior to 
 
htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2010); Gregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials 
of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 464 (2008). 
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litigation. Collective action enhances the likelihood of this type of compliance 
insofar as the aggregated complainants have a larger market power together, 
and can therefore assert greater influence to compel compliance with panel 
decisions. A violator is much more likely to either settle a case or comply in a 
timely manner with an adverse judgment if the threat of retaliation is 
meaningful—in other words, if it is economically significant. While it may be 
impossible for many developing nations, acting alone, to make an 
economically credible threat of retaliation, it may be possible for a group of 
them to do so collectively. Even if the collective threat of retaliation is not 
overwhelming, in economic terms, a collective threat would still carry greater 
weight in terms of the reputational stigma associated with “naming and 
blaming”171 associated with the complaint. 
A second reason that developing nations should be highly interested in 
adopting a class action strategy is that it would better enable them to bring 
suits that advance their own agenda and interests. This can occur in one of two 
ways. The most direct is that bringing complaints before the WTO enables the 
redress of harms that the complainant cares about. Even though most WTO 
cases are brought for economic reasons, one should remember that WTO 
agreements provide opportunities to address political or social harms as well. 
Measures to ensure currency stabilization,172 safeguards against import 
surges,173 and import restrictions for health reasons174 are good examples. One 
plausible explanation for the prevalence of cases dealing primarily with 
economic harms may be that developing nations as a whole are less active in 
dispute settlement.175 As developing nations become more engaged in dispute 
settlement, one can expect to see more cases dealing with political and social 
harms, particularly as they affect developing markets. Similarly, the fact that 
certain substantive WTO agreements are invoked more frequently than others 
in dispute settlement reflects the relative quiescence of developing nations. 
GATT 1947, the original agreement dealing with trade in goods that was 
incorporated into the new WTO, dominates as the most frequently invoked, 
 
 171 See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980). 
 172 See GATT, supra note 28, art. 15. 
 173 See id. art. 19; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 149, Annex 1A. See generally YONG-SHIK LEE, 
SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (2d ed. 2005). 
 174 See GATT, supra note 28, art. 20(b). See generally Katie A. Lane, Comment, Protectionism or 
Environmental Activism? The WTO as a Means of Reconciling the Conflict Between Global Free Trade and 
the Environment, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 103, 109 (2001). 
 175 See Davey, supra note 59. 
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accounting for 36% of all cases from 1995 to 2006.176 Within GATT 1947 
itself, the provisions most commonly invoked deal with basic non-
discrimination principles (29.2% of all GATT cases during the same period),177 
quantitative restrictions (12.1%),178 and complaints about the impositions of 
duties (10.3%).179 After GATT 1947, the next most often-invoked 
agreements—all of three of them annexes to the GATT—account for only a 
total of about a quarter of invocations: the Agreement on Implementation of 
Art. VI of GATT 1994 (antidumping) (9.5%);180 the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (9.3%);181 and the Agreement on Agriculture 
(7.5%).182 The other agreements and annexes that one would expect to be of 
great interest to developing nations, such as the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (2.1%),183 the Agreement on Safeguards (4.5%),184 and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(4%),185 constitute a de minimis percentage of all cases. The fact that the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing—an agreement relevant to many 
developing nations—has been invoked in only 2.1% of all cases brought in the 
first decade of the WTO is highly suggestive of the types of cases that might be 
“missing” due to the current passive role developing nations play in dispute 
settlement. 
In addition to vindicating the interests of more developing nations directly 
through litigation, a class action strategy may also advance their interests in 
negotiations conducted in the shadow of litigation. Most WTO complaints are 
settled.186 Class action suits can strengthen a developing nation’s settlement 
position in three ways. First, power in numbers minimizes the risk or perceived 
risk of extrajudicial threats of retaliation—such as suspension of foreign aid, 
military aid or even food aid—by more politically powerful nations.187 Second, 
 
 176 Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995–2006: Some 
Descriptive Statistics 12–13 (Research Inst. of Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 740, 2008), available at 
http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/Wp/wp740.pdf. 
 177 Id. at 14. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 12. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 13. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See, e.g., Shaffer et al., supra note 170, at 464. 
 187 Id. at 411 (arguing that developing nations face such political constraints in initiating a WTO 
complaint). But see generally Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The 
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the reputation harms of non-compliance or foot-dragging in compliance 
increases with the number of complainants. Third, the ability of a developing 
nation to succeed in dispute settlement strengthens its hand in future cases and 
in political negotiations. 
2. Practical Challenges of the Proposal 
A WTO member may raise a number of objections to adopting a class 
action strategy. Of these possible objections, this Subpart addresses the 
threshold questions of practicability. Broadly, practicability objections may be 
divided into four categories: (1) disincentives to act as lead plaintiff; (2) class 
action coordination challenges; (3) potential lack of alignment regarding 
outcomes; and (4) problems of information sharing, including confidentiality 
and attorney-client privilege. 
a. Burdens on the Lead Complainant 
The lead complainant or plaintiff in a WTO class action lawsuit must 
shoulder many burdens. The lead plaintiff must spearhead all aspects of the 
complicated and lengthy dispute settlement procedure, a process that requires 
difficult political and legal decisions. The lead plaintiff needs to coordinate 
with private outside counsel, now used in virtually all WTO cases,188 even if 
the lead plaintiff member has sophisticated and experienced internal legal 
counsel, which most developing nations lack. Overseeing the class and 
coordinating class members’ legal positions also requires considerable effort. It 
can be difficult to comply with the WTO’s stringent procedural requirements, 
particularly its time-frames for legal submissions and responses to panel 
questions and requests.189 Given the formidable amount of resources and time 
commitment required to mount a successful class action, it is not unreasonable 
to ask whether any developing nation would step up to the plate to the take on 
the role of lead plaintiff. 
 
Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (2005) (arguing that market capacity is more 
relevant to developing nations than power politics in the selection of defendants because those developing 
nations tend to bring complaints against those WTO members who represent their largest markets). 
 188 See Roderick Abbott, Are Developing Countries Deterred from Using the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System? 15 (ECIPE, Working Paper No. 01, 2007), available at http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-
working-papers/are-developing-countries-deterred-from-using-the-wto-dispute-settlement-system/PDF (“What 
has become clear is that assistance from outside lawyers in the preparation of cases, and in drawing up legal 
arguments, has become the norm . . . .”). 
 189 See Shaffer et al., supra note 170, at 409 (arguing that government representatives and private 
attorneys particularly emphasize the problem of complying with dispute settlement deadlines). 
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While the burdens are not negligible, and are indeed daunting, they need to 
be balanced against the benefits. No developing nations should undertake the 
role of lead complainant out of pure altruism. Indeed, no developing nation 
could afford to act on altruism alone. The decision must make legal, economic, 
and political sense. Legally, a developing nation must be convinced that being 
part of a class increases its chances of success. This fact could be true either 
because it may be easier to demonstrate economic, material injury in the 
aggregate, or because information-sharing among class members strengthens 
the individual as well as collective case. Since so many WTO complaints 
require sophisticated econometric data, it is not unusual to engage outside 
economic consulting firms to analyze such data.190 The benefits of economies 
of scale accrue in commissioning such economic analysis en masse.191 Cost 
savings of this type may justify the burdens of class action litigation. The 
ability to share the cost of outside legal counsel, usually paid at high U.S. or 
European billing rates,192 may also provide an economic incentive for the 
strategy. Politically, the decision to join or spearhead a class action will most 
likely be informed by the likelihood of success, the ability of a developing 
nation to initiate a case on its own, and the perceived risk of domestic or 
foreign opposition to the case, including the possibility of extralegal retaliation 
by the defendant. In summary, the decision to lead a class action lawsuit 
requires a careful balancing of delicate and complex considerations. It will not 
make sense to go forward in all cases. However, in some cases, the legal, 
economic, or political gains will outweigh the potential drawbacks. 
b. Coordination Challenges 
Once the decision to proceed with the class action occurs, other challenges 
arise. Coordinating decision-making among class members will not be easy. In 
addition to the logistical difficulties of complying with WTO dispute 
settlement timetables, the lead plaintiff must secure agreement regarding tricky 
strategic questions. Internal disagreements may arise among the class over 
litigation strategy, such as which claims to advance. Many WTO disputes 
present alternative legal theories.193 It is not uncommon to base a violation 
 
 190 See id. at 461 (describing how Brazil hired the economic consulting firm DATAGRO to provide sugar 
and ethanol market analysis in the EC-Sugar case). 
 191 See id. at 410–11. 
 192 See id. at 461. 
 193 See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Indonesia, United States—Measures Affecting the Production 
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/1 (Apr. 14, 2010) (making claims under GATT, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement); Request for Consultations 
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claim on general non-discrimination principles as well as specific provisions of 
the WTO agreements. For example, alleging violations of specific provisions 
of GATT, one might challenge a tariff structure on the grounds that it favors 
domestic producers (national treatment),194 discriminates among foreign 
producers (MFN),195 constitutes an unlawful imposition of duty (Article II),196 
or functions as a prohibited quantitative restriction (Article XI).197 Each claim 
requires a different legal theory and factual support. There may be 
disagreements among the class over which claim or claims to advance. 
Disagreement may be based on differing, good faith assessments of the merits 
of each claim, but it could also be motivated by extralegal concerns like a 
country’s broader negotiation strategy or political agenda. For example, 
whether or not a country is engaged in negotiations on regional or bilateral free 
trade agreements with a defendant may impact that country’s choice of claims. 
It may be politically untenable to negotiate for lower tariffs on the one hand 
while claiming discriminatory application of tariffs on the other hand. 
The potential for internal disagreements over allocation of remedies is also 
worrisome. One of the primary benefits of the strategy—the enhanced ability 
to secure compliance with panel rulings—would be severely compromised if 
the class were unable to agree on how to aggregate retaliation. A lack of 
 
by the European Communities, India—Certain Taxes and Other Measures on Imported Wines and Spirits, 
WT/DS380/1 (Feb. 24, 2010) (making claims under GATT and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement). 
 194 The national treatment clause in Article III of the GATT imposes the principle of nondiscrimination 
between domestically produced goods and similar goods produced abroad and imported. GATT, supra note 
28, art. III. The clause prevents government practices that impose higher tariffs or restrict market access 
options for imported goods. Id. Several panels have explored this area of the GATT. In United States—Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the panel clarified two features of Article III(4): (1) that the article does not 
differentiate between substantive of procedural internal regulations; and (2) that the burden is on the 
contracting party imposing the different treatment to show that its treatment is not less favorable. Panel Report, 
United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶¶ 5.10–5.11, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989). To illustrate these 
features, in Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, the Korean government 
required that stores separate domestic and imported beef by selling it in either different sections or in different 
stores. Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 593, 
WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R (July 31, 2000). In this case, the different treatment would have created greater 
costs for imported beef because of the separate facilities—making the treatment less favorable. It should be 
noted that Article III only protects against government-imposed, less favorable treatment. 
 195 At its most basic level, most-favored-nation treatment means non-discrimination between countries. 
See generally Martin Domke & John N. Hazard, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 55 (1958). See also Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization? Criticism, Yes . . . 
Misinformation, No!, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/ 
misinf_e/07ineq_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
 196 See GATT, supra note 28, art. II. 
 197 Id. art. XI. 
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cohesion at this stage would undermine the effectiveness of the threat. Because 
retaliation is rarely implemented,198 it is paramount that the class present a 
unified front on the possibility of collective retaliation to pressure defendants 
to comply with panel rulings. Therefore, the mechanics of implementing 
retaliation are less important than having agreement on what implementation 
might look like. The point is to present a unified front and a credible threat so 
as to have sufficient deterrent effect to enhance the chances of prompt 
compliance with WTO decisions. 
It will be essential to clearly outline the contours of a retaliation strategy 
early on in the litigation process. Class members should formulate and agree 
upon a plan for collective retaliation early on in the litigation, ideally as early 
as the request for consultations stage. At the latest, a plan should be in place 
upon the establishment of a panel. In many cases, the lead plaintiff will be the 
obvious choice to impose retaliation because the lead plaintiff is generally the 
party with the greatest market power. However, it may not always be clear 
which country has the greatest clout. For example, identifying the party to 
exercise retaliation in a class action involving Argentina, Indonesia, and 
Thailand might not be so straightforward as one involving the same parties 
plus Brazil. In close cases, class members should engage a mediator to finalize 
a retaliation plan prior to the establishment of a panel. The plan ought to be 
part of the submissions to the compliance panel199 and subsequent changes to 
the plan should require the approval of the compliance panel. These 
precautions are necessary to ensure that the threat of retaliation remains 
effective. 
c. Lack of Commonality 
Sufficient commonality of fact and law is an essential prerequisite for a 
class action. Some WTO causes of action do not lend themselves well to a 
collective litigation. For example, antidumping is too factually specific, and 
too tied to complicated calculations of material injury to a particular industry—
dependent on unique variables like domestic prices—as to be generalizable. 
Antidumping currently comprises about 9.5% of all WTO disputes.200 
However, while antidumping is significant as a percentage of all WTO cases, it 
is not an area in which developing nations are very active. For example, 
 
 198 Retaliation has been used in only eight cases. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 143, at 58. 
 199 See DSU, supra note 9, art. 21(5). 
 200 See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 176, at 12. 
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developing nations brought only ten cases out of 152 antidumping cases from 
1995 to 2006.201 Least-developed countries brought no antidumping cases in 
the same period.202 Similarly, there may be some cases under the Safeguards 
Agreement wherein factual differences may preclude class action litigation. 
However, safeguards cases comprise only 4.5% of all cases from 1995 to 
2006.203 In conclusion, the proposed class action strategy is not universally 
applicable for all WTO cases. Lack of commonality will preclude its 
deployment in approximately 15% of disputes. 
d. Lack of Alignment on Outcomes 
If settlement is offered on favorable terms to one member of the class, 
another potential problem may arise: a lack of alignment on outcomes for 
different class members. The risk is particularly of concern if a settlement is 
offered to the lead plaintiff to buy off the case. There are several ways to deal 
with this problem. One approach would be to negotiate a private agreement 
among the parties that requires the mutual disclosure of settlement offers and 
sets a voting mechanism to determine the acceptability of the settlement offer. 
Unless clear enforceable penalties are established, this approach is fraught with 
enforcement difficulties. A second approach would be to require the 
supervision of the WTO panel approve settlements and dismiss the case. A 
third, middle-ground approach would be for panels to accept partial settlements 
but dismiss the class without prejudice to enable the suit to continue under a 
different guise. 
e. Confidentiality, Privilege, and Other Information-Flow Concerns 
Some WTO members may hesitate to participate in a class action lawsuit 
due to concerns about confidentiality and privilege. These concerns are fair 
and should be thoughtfully addressed by class members. Careful pre-litigation 
planning is essential. Class members must formulate a comprehensive plan that 
details information flows, designates parties responsible for disseminating 
documents, and ensures that sensitive materials are adequately protected. The 
plan is particularly important when outside consulting firms are involved. If 
outside counsel is hired, the law firm will assume primary responsibility for 
coordinating with the WTO, national government officials, civil society 
 
 201 See id. at 20. 
 202 See id. 
 203 See id. at 13. 
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participants, and consultants. In addition, each class action member should 
designate a person within its government to act as the liaison for the duration 
of the litigation. Admittedly, identifying such an internal liaison will be 
difficult for many developing nations, especially those that lack a well-
functioning trade ministry.204 Nonetheless, a developing nation should view the 
investment in resources as critical to build the capacity to meaningfully 
participate in the WTO. 
Reluctance to share information is probably not as problematic as one 
might expect, at least among developing nations. Evidence suggests that 
developing nations are hungry for more information, even when they are not 
formal participants in a dispute. For example, one developing nation has 
requested that legal submissions be automatically made available to third-party 
participants, unless they are designated as factually confidential.205 Other 
groups of developing nations have proposed changes to the DSU to enable 
them to participate automatically as third parties and to gain greater access to 
proceedings and submissions as third parties.206 These proposed reforms show 
that developing nations crave greater access to dispute settlement information, 
while remaining cognizant of confidentiality concerns. 
B. Systemic Contribution 
Systemic benefits to class action litigation also accrue in a number of 
important ways. First, a class action strategy provides valuable opportunity for 
coordination and cooperation that will enable developing nations to build new 
coalitions and strengthen existing trade ties with other developing nations. 
Second, one cannot underestimate the benefits of greater developing-nation 
participation in the WTO system as a whole, especially in terms of perceived 
legitimacy. Participation in class actions will widen the pool of developing 
nations using the WTO dispute settlement system. This in turn will deepen the 
 
 204 See Shaffer et al., supra note 170, at 424 (“[M]any developing countries lack experienced trade policy 
and dispute settlement professionals.”); see also Marc L. Busch et al., Does Legal Capacity Matter?: 
Explaining Patterns of Protectionism in the Shadow of WTO Litigation 3 (Aug. 25, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/research/capacity.pdf (“To varying 
degrees, developing countries . . . lack . . . legal capacity, impeding their ability to participate fully in WTO 
dispute settlement . . . .”). 
 205 See Proposal by Costa Rica, Third Party Rights, TN/DS/W/12/Rev.1 (Mar. 6, 2003) (suggesting that 
third parties should receive a copy of all documents or information submitted to the panel, at the time of 
submission, except for certain factual confidential information designated as such). 
 206 See, e.g., Proposal by African Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 25, 2002) (suggesting that developing nations should be automatically admitted as third 
parties without having to demonstrate a trade or economic interest in the case). 
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commitment of developing nations to the WTO by making one of its core 
functions available to a previously disenfranchised group. Collective litigation 
will begin to redress existing asymmetries in the use of the DSU. Without it, 
developing nations are likely to remain largely marginalized in WTO litigation. 
Another related benefit is the development of more case law and procedural 
precedents on issues of particular interest to developing nations. Lastly, 
developing nations risk being further left behind in the process of the WTO’s 
deepening judicialization as more issues are handled via dispute settlement due 
to negotiation gridlock. Class action litigation is an efficient way to widen as 
well as deepen the process of WTO judicialization. 
C. Impact on Negotiations 
Implementation of a class action strategy will have a significant impact on 
the course of Doha207 and future rounds of WTO negotiations. From the 
perspective of developing nations, there are four major advantages. First, as 
collective litigation should lead to stronger, tighter-knit coalitions among 
developing nations, it should make it easier for these coalitions to push forward 
their agendas in negotiations. Second, developing nations can use the threat of 
collective litigation as leverage to lend weight to their positions in 
negotiations. Third, participation in class actions is likely to highlight other 
bases of commonality among members, creating the potential for collaboration 
in negotiations. Fourth, information development and sharing derived from 
litigation may enable litigants to develop more robust negotiation positions. 
For example, Brazil used its experience and econometric data that it gathered 
for litigation in the U.S.-Upland Cotton and EC-Sugar cases to catapult it into 
the influential G-4, a group comprised of the United States, EU, India, and 
Brazil that played a large role in shaping the agenda for agricultural 
negotiations in the Doha Round.208 
Three risks must be weighed against the preceding four advantages of 
negotiations. First, it is possible that in the short term, a developing nation 
could gain more in negotiations by yielding to inducements to quit the class. A 
 
 207 Understanding the WTO: The Doha Agenda, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 208 See Shaffer et al., supra note 170, at 451 (describing econometric simulation analysis of the impact of 
tariff and subsidy reductions on Brazil as essential in helping Brazil formulate its negotiation position on 
agricultural issues in Doha); Ernesto Zedillo, Summer of Setbacks, FORBES, Aug. 13, 2007, at 31; see also 
Robert Wolfe, Canada’s Adventures in Clubland: Trade Clubs and Political Influence, in CANADA AMONG 
NATIONS 2007: WHAT ROOM TO MANOEUVRE? 181, 192 (Jean Daudelin & Daniel Schwanen eds., 2008). 
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small developing nation is particularly vulnerable to offers to abandon the class 
in exchange for negotiated gains in Doha or other contexts. Second, there is a 
risk of fragmentation or even disintegration of negotiation blocs if defendants 
pursue divide-and-conquer strategies in settlement discussions in ongoing class 
actions. Third, and most worrisome, is the possibility that the collective action 
advantages described above might crumble under the pressures of prolonged 
Doha negotiations. Coalitions based on shared experience can prove to be 
fragile. Nonetheless, one should note that because of all three risks, the 
negotiation gains of class action litigation may not be fully realized in some 
circumstances—but not that there would be no gains altogether. 
D. Governmental Coordination Difficulties 
One of the greatest obstacles facing developing nations is a lack of national 
legal expertise in WTO law, both within the government and the domestic bar. 
Often, the lack of legal expertise correlates with a paucity of qualified human 
resources within both WTO missions and domestic ministries. Indeed, many 
developing nations lack a permanent presence in Geneva.209 Many more have 
zero or at best one or two trade lawyers qualified to practice WTO law.210 
Personnel constraints are exacerbated by resource shortages. Developing WTO 
members have less financial resources to spend on the direct costs of hiring 
outside legal counsel. But, they also have less leeway in the indirect or 
opportunity costs of dedicating government personnel to oversee and support a 
WTO case. Committing resources to WTO litigation involves significant costs 
for developing nations because those scarce resources could be devoted to 
other needs, including immediate social needs.211 Richer nations with resources 
earmarked for WTO litigation do not face the same difficult tradeoffs. 
While these resource constraints are significant, particularly in the short 
term, they need to be weighed against the long-term gains of collective 
litigation, which may be the only way that many developing nations can afford 
to engage in WTO disputes. Engaging in class actions will lead to more 
governmental expertise in trade law and the WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures. While the initial commitment of human resources is costly, it will 
make it possible to develop gradually a competent bureaucracy to lead future 
disputes and to guide a developing nation’s effective and full participation in 
 
 209 See Cai, supra note 13, at 312. 
 210 See Shaffer et al., supra note 170, at 409. 
 211 See id. at 410–11. 
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the WTO. The fostering of personnel with legal, technical, and negotiation 
expertise in trade is a long-term investment. Developing nations must be 
careful to structure their civil service to ensure a continuity of personnel with 
expertise for handling WTO disputes and negotiations. They should create 
incentives to ensure that those who develop such expertise do not rotate out 
into other areas. Collective litigation can also strengthen intergovernmental 
ties, not just in trade disputes, but also in other areas related to economic 
growth. Trade personnel often need to work closely with other governmental 
institutions such as taxing authorities, health officials, and financial sector 
officials, to build effective cases. Intergovernmental cooperation of this type, 
sustained for long periods of time, will also benefit developing nations in the 
long run. 
The need to husband scarce resources and balance competing needs 
presents unique coordination challenges for developing nations. Departments 
that have pressing immediate needs will argue that the legal costs of 
participating in a WTO dispute are too high, as the outcome is uncertain. Thus, 
proceeding with a WTO case could alienate domestic constituencies. 
Moreover, participating in a class action could be perceived as a loss of 
governmental autonomy, especially in cultures where collective action is 
unknown or rare. Lastly, there is a risk that being a class action member may 
compromise government positions in non-litigated arenas. This could occur in 
one of two ways. First, because WTO disputes can take a long time, a 
government may wish to pursue policies (including new litigation) that are 
incompatible with the litigation position it has taken in the class action. 
Similarly, pending litigation may make it tougher for a class action member to 
enter into favorable bilateral or regional trade agreements or to undertake 
independent negotiation positions. 
E. Legal Obstacles 
WTO textual obstacles are sparse. There is room within the DSU for 
nations to unilaterally adopt a collective litigation strategy without any 
amendments to the DSU. The parameter that must be followed is that the total 
amount of retaliation must not exceed the harm sustained by the class as a 
whole.212 
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However, despite the lack of textual prohibitions, there are legal obstacles 
to adoption. Developing nations will need to convince panels and the Appellate 
Body that the strategy works. The lack of precedent for the strategy will be 
troubling for some panels. Panels may also be troubled by the fact that class 
action litigation is a dramatic extension of the role of the third party. 
Traditionally, WTO members participate as third parties only when they have a 
systemic interest in the case. However, the DSU is characterized by much 
flexibility and a relative lack of procedural rules. It is likely possible to 
introduce and successfully pursue collective litigation. 
F. Public-Private Interaction 
It is very difficult to prosecute WTO disputes without the assistance of the 
private sector.213 Success in WTO dispute settlement requires private sector 
participation in three main areas. First, industry groups can identify violations 
that may form the basis of a WTO complaint.214 Second, in the area of 
information-gathering, industry is often best positioned to gather and analyze 
econometric data to support a WTO complaint.215 Lastly, the private sector can 
help pay for outside counsel, which a government may not be able to afford on 
its own. In all three areas, developing nations are at a severe disadvantage 
compared to their more developed counterparts, due to resource constraints as 
well as a lack of functioning civil society watchdogs or active industry groups 
that can monitor and identify potential violations. 
Developing nations face greater challenges in fostering effective public-
private collaboration. They often lack established channels for such 
cooperation, both in terms of institutional and personnel deficits.216 Moreover, 
where there are less transparent societies or non-vibrant democracies,217 
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distrust of the government can hinder private collaboration.218 Lastly, 
developing nations simply have scarcer resources to devote to the institution-
building necessary to enable effective public-private partnerships. 
The class action proposal alleviates many of these disadvantages. The 
proposal provides a mechanism to spread the costs of litigation and economic 
analysis and to pool the resources of industry or nascent civil society groups to 
share the burdens of monitoring and information gathering. Thus, collective 
litigation can provide the catalyst for effective government-industry 
partnership. 
Three other benefits may accrue. First, the diffusion of trade expertise 
across public and private sectors will foster the formation of a strong pluralist 
civil society. If consumer or industry watchdog groups realize they can play a 
pivotal role in trade policy formation or dispute settlement, they will have the 
incentive to be more active. Second, insofar as many developing and least 
developing countries use the services of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(“ACWL”), a nonprofit that provides basic legal services and advice—but not 
representation—to developing nations at nominal cost,219 the ACWL will be 
better able to provide coordinated support to a class. Other civil society 
organizations such as Oxfam,220 which can provide data gathering and analysis 
support or write amicus briefs, will also be better able to provide coordinated 
assistance. Lastly, any involvement by civil society actors constitutes a 
valuable gain in transparency, which is one of the WTO’s primary goals.221 
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CONCLUSION 
The class action strategy proposed in this Article offers numerous 
advantages for developing nations and the international trading system. It 
provides a means to bring those that have little incentive to participate in 
dispute settlement into the system. Smaller and developing nations that may 
have justifiably felt that the system was too costly and offered them little in 
meaningful redress would have a means to participate in a way that alleviates 
both problems. These nations would have the opportunity to share litigation 
costs, information, and legal expertise at comparably little expense. The 
experience would then broaden and deepen the necessary legal and economic 
capacity needed for them to play a more meaningful role not only in dispute 
settlement, but also in other arenas of trade law. The sort of in-depth 
familiarity with the WTO regime that comes from litigation enhances 
effectiveness in negotiations at ministerial conferences.222 Showing a 
willingness to enforce its rights also strengthens a nation’s negotiating 
position. 
Most importantly, the strategy enables small economies and those with 
smaller claims to enforce their rights. It might therefore make up for some of 
the missing developing nation cases that are not making it on the DSB 
docket.223 In particular, the strategy may entice least-developed countries—
which are mostly absent224—to engage in dispute settlement as complainants. 
There are also advantages for the larger or middle-income nation to act as 
the named plaintiff. There are collective-action, prestige, and reputational 
benefits. Gratitude to the lead plaintiff may translate into a country’s 
willingness to lend support in subsequent negotiations. The strategy allows 
developing nations to build networks for collective action. To some extent, this 
is already happening.225 There are also prestige and reputational gains in being 
viewed as both a leader and champion of weaker nations. Moreover, the ability 
to trade or pool retaliation within the class provides an incentive for large 
nation to participate. Smaller nations are more likely to gain compliance 
because they can leverage the greater economic power of the named plaintiff 
and other class members. 
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Class actions serve important societal functions. They are often used as a 
tool to compensate for small losses226 and enforce regulations.227 They enable 
less powerful groups to act as private attorneys general.228 They have also been 
effectively employed as a means for lasting social change, as during the civil 
rights era.229 As a result of all these dynamics, class actions more deeply 
embed social values embodied in laws in the greater society by giving voice to 
the otherwise voiceless. Class actions in the WTO will give developing nations 
a voice in the WTO, provide them with a meaningful way to enforce rules, and 
enable them to participate more fully in the WTO. 
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